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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
LESA DENICE BIRD, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, PETITION FOR REHEARING 
-vs- Trial Court No. 88-431-9991DA 
Appeal Court No. 940419-CA 
BRIAN BIRD, Priority Classification 2 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Plaintiff/Appellant, (hereinafter "petitioner"), submits the 
following Petition for Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Counsel for petitioner hereby 
certifies that this petition is presented in good faith and not for 
the purpose of delay. 
POINTS OF LAW AND FACT OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED 
1. On April 6, 1995, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its 
unpublished Memorandum Decision affirming the trial court's order 
of contempt, in part, on the grounds that the petitioner did not 
appeal the underlying visitation orders and did not demonstrate 
that the underlying orders are illegal. 
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2. Petitioner files this request for rehearing on the 
grounds that this court has overlooked or misapprehended the 
following points of fact: 
a. A telephone conference was held on March 28, 1994 
between the court and counsel for both parties on father's motion 
to reinstate visitation. The trial court signed a written order 
setting forth its visitation order commencing on March 28, 1994. 
(R. 280-281) . The March 28, 1994 order was signed by the court on 
the same day that it was submitted. The order does not reflect 
that it was ever submitted to petitioner's then counsel. (R. 281) . 
On or about May 5, 1994, petitioner's new counsel filed a motion 
for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) & (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
b. On May 9, 1994, the trial court issued a ruling from 
the bench which modified the March 28, 1994 visitation order. (R. 
81 & R. 280). The trial court signed both plaintiff's and 
defendant's proposed orders, which orders differed in material 
respects with one another and with the court's unsigned Minute 
Entries. (R. 355 & R. 470) . The court resolved the differences and 
entered an Amended Order on August 8, 1994, but not before the 
trial court again modified the May 9, 1994 visitation order. (R. 
484-488 Sc R. 451-453) . 
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c. The hearing held on May 9, 1994, before the trial 
court was continued to May 24, 1994. (R. 485). 
d. At each hearing held in this matter which led up to 
the contempt citation, the trial court modified the prior 
visitation orders of the next earliest hearing. The March 28, 1994 
visitation order modified the visitation order under the Decree of 
Divorce. (Compare R. 81 with R. 280-281). The May 9, 1994 
visitation order modified the visitation order from March 28, 1994. 
(Compare R. 280 with R. 484). The May 24, 1994 visitation order 
modified the visitation order from May 9, 1994. (Compare R. 443 
with R. 484) . 
e. On May 5, 1994, Petitioner filed a motion requesting 
a child abuse investigation. (R. 294) Her motion was denied by 
order entered June 16, 1994. (R. 448). 
f. At the hearing held on May 9, 1994, mother raised 
the issue of best interests of the children with respect to a 
visitation order (Tr. at 11) ; the issue of transitional visitation 
(Tr. at 11); and the issue of an abuse investigation (Tr. at 12 & 
15) . The trial court stated that the children would be placed into 
protective custody or mother would agree to visitation. (Tr. at 
16) . The parties stipulated that issues raised by both of the 
parties would be continued to May 24, 1994. (Tr. at 25). 
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g. At the hearing held on May 24, 1994, mother moved 
the court for a supervised visitation order that considered the 
best interests of the children including new evidence from the 
children's therapist; the need for transitional visitation; and the 
need for an abuse investigation. (Tr. at 39 & 40, 12, 13, 42, 48) . 
The order following the May 24, 1994, hearing was entered on June 
16, 1994. (R. 443). 
h. Petitioner filed her Notice of Appeal on July 15, 
1994. (R. 474) . 
i. In her brief, petitioner argued that the trial court 
abused its discretion by failing to apply the best interests 
requirement of section 30-3-5; the fact that the trial court 
refused to consider the fact that visitation had not occurred for 
an extended period of time and the children were not bonded with 
the noncustodial parent as required by section 30-3-36; by refusing 
to suspend proceedings and order an abuse investigation as required 
by section 30-3-5.2; and refused to consider significant evidence 
of the children's severe and continuing emotional and psychological 
disturbance following visitation with their father. (Brief at 23-
34). Petitioner cited with great specificity to the pages in the 
record supporting her claim and to the relevant law. 
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j . The father in this case did not submit an affidavit 
alleging contempt on April 22, May 14, May 15 and May 21 until the 
very day of the contempt hearing. (Tr. at 17). 
3. Further, petitioner files this request for rehearing on 
the grounds that this court has overlooked or misapprehended the 
following points of law: 
a. The March 28, 1994 order was not a "final order" 
until the trial court disposed of petitioner's motion to issue an 
abuse investigation order on June 16, 1994. (R. 447-448) . Pearson 
v. Pearson, 641 P.2d 103 (Utah 1982); Allred v. Allred, 807 P.2d 
350 (Utah App. 1991); Rule 54(b) of the Utah R. Civ. Procedure. 
b. The May 9, 1994, visitation order did not become a 
final order until the trial court resolved the differences between 
the two contrasting orders submitted by counsel for the parties and 
disposed of both parties' pending motions. Larsen v. Larsen, 674 
P.2d 116 (Utah 1983); State in the Interest of T.D.C., 748 P.2d 201 
(Utah App. 1988) . 
c. Pursuant to rule 4(c) of the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, this appeal is timely filed in that the Notice of Appeal 
was filed after the announcement of the May 9, 1994, visitation 
order but before the entry of the judgment on August 8, 1994, and 
must be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
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R. Utah Ct. App. 4(c); Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 P. 2d 999 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
d. Petitioner was entitled to prior notice that her 
former husband was charging her with refusal to release the 
children for visitation on April 22, May 14, May 15 and May 21. 
Bogas v. Boaas, 824 P. 2d 478 (Utah App. 1991) . Petitioner did not 
have adequate time to prepare her defense. 
ARGUMENT 
A. PETITIONER TIMELY FILED AN APPEAL OF THE VISITATION AND 
CONTEMPT ORDERS. 
The petitioner filed her notice of appeal on July 15, 
1994. (R. 474) . This date was within thirty days of the contempt 
order and within thirty days of the only final visitation order. 
In Pearson v. Pearson, 641 P.2d 103, (Utah 1982), the 
parties were divorced in May, 1979. Approximately six months 
later, the wife brought an order to show cause against husband 
seeking contempt sanctions. Prior to the hearing, husband 
requested that the court set aside the stipulated divorce pursuant 
to Rule 60(b)(7). The court concluded that the prior order should 
be set aside and the matter set for further hearing to resolve the 
claims raised by both parties. Thereafter, wife appealed the 
court's decision to set aside the prior order. Wife's appeal was 
dismissed on the grounds that there was no final order from which 
an appeal could be taken. Id. at 105. 
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In Allred v. Allred, 807 P.2d 350 (Utah App. 1991), the 
trial court vacated certain visitation provisions of the divorce 
decree pursuant to Rule 60(b) and ordered further proceedings. 
This court held that until the trial court addressed all of the 
remaining pending issues, the decree did not constitute a final 
order from which an appeal could be taken. Jd. at 351. 
When the parties in this case appeared before the court 
on May 9, 1994, the court materially changed the visitation order 
that had been issued during the March 28, 1994, telephone 
conference. The remaining issues raised by both parties were 
continued until May 24, 1994: 
Ms. Jelte: Then there is the issue of 
contempt that is outstanding. That will be 
continued for hearing on the 24th with the 
other issues that are presently before the 
court. I believe that's it. 
Judge Young: All right. Mr. Harrison, you 
have heard the stipulation; do you concur? 
Mr. Harrison: Yes, I do. (Tr. at 25). 
The comments of the court and counsel indicate that the 
March 2 8th and May 9th orders were not intended to be a final 
disposition of the matter. 
Following the May 9th hearing, a new visitation schedule 
was imposed. However, both counsel submitted orders and the court 
signed both versions of the order on June 15, 1994. The court 
resolved the differences in the two orders and a final order was 
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entered on August 8, 1994. (R. 484). Petitioner filed her notice 
of appeal after announcement of the decision, but prior to the 
entry of the May 9th order. Rule 4(c) of the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure provides that the filing of a notice to appeal after 
announcement of the decision, but prior to entry is treated as 
"filed after such entry and on the day thereof.11 Accordingly, 
petitioner timely challenged the visitation and contempt orders. 
The court wholly disposed of all remaining claims on May 
24, 1994, when the court issued its contempt citation and denied 
petitioner's motions for an abuse investigation and transitional 
supervised visitation. In the order, drafted by respondent's 
counsel, the court stated: 
13. The Court has been requested by the 
Plaintiff to order an abuse evaluation 
consistent with Section 30-3-5.2 and 62(a)-4-
509 of Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
The Court finds that there is an inadequate 
basis for the Court to make such a 
recommendation and denies the same. (R. 447) . 
The May 24th order was entered June 16, 1994. 
Petitioner's appeal was filed within thirty days thereafter. 
B. PETITIONER ADEQUATELY MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE THAT THE 
UNDERLYING VISITATION ORDER WAS UNLAWFUL. 
Petitioner relies upon the statements of the court cited 
in her brief to support her claim that the underlying visitation 
order was unlawful in that the court placed the interests of the 
father over that of the children: 
8 
Well, you see the thing that occurs to me, 
however, is all of this is very stale. I 
would prefer to have the parties agree between 
themselves as to how to reinstate visitation. 
If that is being barred then it seems to me 
that probably what I ought to do is place the 
children, as traumatic as that may be, in 
protective custody, and then let the 
protective custody people allow for some 
visitation as well by both parents and take 
the matter from there. I think that you can 
have relative confidence that the children 
will not be abused by the father, even though 
you may think there is a history of that early 
on or beyond two years ago. It would seem to 
me the efforts he is trying to make with 
visitation would be inconsistent with a desire 
to abuse the children, but we need to be sure 
that we do everything we can to protect 
against further confrontation between these 
parties. (R. 555, emphasis added.) 
The court refused to apply the mandatory provisions of 
the abuse investigation statute, although it did not have the 
discretion to do so. See Utah Code §30-3-5.2 (1994) . The children 
were placed in protective custody, despite the acknowledgement by 
the court that this would result in additional trauma to them. 
With all due respect to the court, the paramount concern for the 
best interest of the children was cast by the wayside. 
C. PETITIONER WAS NOT GIVEN PRIOR NOTICE OF ALL OF THE CHARGES. 
The former husband in this case filed his affidavit 
charging petitioner with refusing visitation after April 8th during 
the contempt hearing. (Tr. at 17). In Boggs v. Boggs. 824 P.2d 
478 (Utah App. 1991), this court reversed the trial court's order 
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of contempt, in part, upon the failure to file an affidavit of the 
charges prior to the contempt hearing. Id. at 482. This court 
concluded that the alleged contemnor "did not receive ample 
notice." id. The petitioner did not have full knowledge of the 
nature of the charge and an opportunity to defend. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED 
Petitioner requests that this court restore this case to 
the calendar for reargument. Petitioner timely filed her appeal 
within thirty days of the contempt order and the only final 
visitation order. Petitioner has marshalled the evidence that the 
underlying visitation order was not lawful. She has directed this 
court to ample authority to support her position that the order did 
not consider the best interests of the children; did not require an 
abuse investigation consistent with the statute; and, did not 
address the children's need for transitional visitation. 
DATED THIS j f) day of /j-yy^J^ , 1995. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
1.' JOY iZELTg // 
Pet for Petitioner 
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